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Foundations Used as Business Devices
Howard L. Oleck*
N RECENT YEARS the multiplication of charitable foundations in
the United States has been phenomenal. Everyone knows of
the fine work being done by such great organizations as the Ford
Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, and many others. Not
quite so well known is the multiplication of smaller foundations
endowed primarily for tax and business advantages-the hypo-
critical use of the mantle of "charity" to cover basically selfish
motives. In 1930 there were less than 250 foundations in the
United States.' In 1944 there were over 500, with combined assets
of $1.8 billion and annual expenditures of $72 million.2 In 1955
there were about 5000 foundations with combined assets of about
$5.5 billion.3 How many there are today is known only to God,
and to some extent to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Any discussion of foundations is a delicate matter. Most
foundations probably are established and operated for worthy and
noble purposes. Criticism of any kind of charitable organization
is likely to be viewed almost as an attack on virtue (or as sub-
versive), even when the particular organization's charitableness
is very doubtful. Therefore, the author addresses these prelimi-
nary words to every interested settlor, founder, trustee, director,
officer, agent, and employee of every foundation:
"In what follows, I do not mean you. This discussion applies
only to the ones to whom it applies-and you are not one of them.
And I love the grand old American way of life."
Moreover, this paper is only a sketch of the subject, which
would require (and much needs) a massive volume in order to
treat it fully.
Business Purposes
Chief among the business purposes involved in use of chari-
table foundations are these: 4
*Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Berman and Berman, Tax Advantages of Foundations and Exempt
Organizations, 4 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 124 (1955); 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation
Law, Chap. 14 (1958). See also, Keppel, The Foundation (1930); Andrews,
Philanthropic Foundations (1956); Kiger, Operating Principles of the Larger
Foundations (1954); Wormser, Foundations (1958).
2 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Assns. 398 (1956).
3 Ibid. And see Andrews, Philanthropic Foundations (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1956); American Foundations and Their Fields (New
York: Raymond Rich Associates, 1946); Philanthropic Foundations and
Higher Education (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1938); Yearbook of
Philanthropy (New York: Inter-River Press, 1943); National Associations of
the United States, 606-610 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Dept. of Commerce,
Govt. Printing Office, 1949). And see infra, n. 4.
4 Berman, supra note 1. See the story of foundation use to finance the
growth of the Textron industrial complex, in, Comment, The Modern Phil-
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(1) Tax avoidance. The corporation tax of 52% and the in-
dividual income tax of up to 91% are so severe that
high-bracket taxpayers can give to charity at small cost.
As a result the family and corporate foundation is the
fastest growing type. Inheritance and income taxes are
avoided.
(2) Perpetuation of control. The controlling stockholder of
a close corporation, for example, may rule the corpora-
tion from the grave; or family control may be main-
tained.
(3) Public relations. "But the greatest of these is charity."5
(4) Research and product development. For public and
industry benefit (and first use by the founder's organ-
ization is only fair).
(5) Systematizing normal charity gifts. Orderly and busi-
nesslike charitable contribution, instead of hit-or-miss
giving.
(6) Prestige. Puts the founder's name in the same category
with Ford and Carnegie.
(7) Competitive advantage. Obviously, over competitors
who pay normal taxes.
(8) Little regulation. The lack of government supervision
is a fact, despite the "public" nature of foundations.
(Continued from preceding page)
anthropic Foundation: A Critique and a Proposal, 59 Yale L. J. 477, 492
(1950); and see Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organiza-
tion?, 44 A. B. A. J. 525 (1958); Merritt, Tax Incentives for Charitable
Giving, 36 Taxes 646 (1958); Hudson, Giving Through Private Charitable
Organizations, 108 J. Account. 31 (1959); Note, "Private" Charitable Trusts,
103 Sol. J. 404 (May 22, 1959); Note, Bequests for Mixed Charitable and
Non-Charitable Objects, 21-22 Ir. Jur. 1 (1955-6); Baldwin, Charitable
Foundations, 26 Detroit Law 15 (1958); Symposium on Charitable Trusts,
18 Ohio St. L. J. 149 (1957); Friedman, Corporate Power, Government by
Private Groups and the Law, 57 Col. L. R. 155 (1957); Brown and Coblentz,
Charitable Trust in California, 30 Calif. St. B. J. 425 (Sept.-Oct. 1955);
Vestal, Critical Evaluation of the Charitable Trust as a Giving Device, 1957
Wash. U. L. Q. 195 (1957); Young, Planning and Management of Charitable
Foundations, 35 Trust Bull. 36 (1956); Martin, Trust and the Fundatio, 15
Jurist 11 (1955); Marshall, When Is Charitable Not Charitable?, 19 Modem
L. R. 92 (1956); Headly, Four Family Situations for Using the Community
Foundation, 96 Trusts & Est. 328 (1957); Dwight, Objections to Judicial
Approval of Charters of Non-Profit Corporations, 12 Bus. Law 454 (1957);
Wham, Reece Report on Foundations, 36 Chi. B. Rec. 447 (1955); Barr,
Tax-Exempt Foundations, 101 J. Account. 38 (1956); Note, Taxation-
What Is Exempt from Taxation as Public Charity Under the Texas Con-
stitution?, 7 Baylor L. R. 494 (1955). See also the extensive bibliography in
Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Assns. 333-334 (1956), 2 Oleck, Modem
Corporation Law 104, 632 (1959), and Vol. 1, supra, n. 1. And the English
literature is full of material on foundations. See Index to Legal Periodicals,
any issue of recent years. England long has had at least 20,000 foundations.
5 1 Cor. 13:13 "And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the
greatest of these is charity."
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Business purposes now so often are dominant in the forma-
tion of "charitable foundations" that the importance of that mo-
tive hardly needs to be emphasized. It is enough to point out that
tax experts and others now speak of foundations as a major type
of "business device," of which "their range has barely been
touched" despite revisions of the tax laws.6 Some say that "the
only interests which appear to be adversely affected by such
(non-profit) incorporation are those of creditors and the govern-
mental interest in tax revenues." 7 This latter is almost charming
in its frank amorality.
More specifically, however, the foundation (e.g., a family
foundation) "will be able to accumulate significantly more dollars
in a foundation than in a corporation, in a trust, or in a personal
portfolio . . . [While] tax privileges . . . make it possible to
conserve assets and to build up funds more easily than in a profit-
making corporation . . Rents [in under-5-year leases, with
some limitations], dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains, are
received tax free . . . [And] we get full exemption . . . for gifts
to it-if its income is of the investment type . . . [And] taxpayer
or his family are not prohibited from dealing with a foundation."8
The advantages have been summed up thus: 9
What can be accomplished by creating a foundation?
1. Keep control of wealth.
2. Can keep for the donor many attributes of wealth by
many means.
(a) Designating the administrative management of the
foundation.
(b) Control over its investments.
(c) Appointing relatives (and of course the founder) as
directors of foundation.
(d) Foundation's assets can be used to borrow money to
buy other property that does not jeopardize its pur-
poses. Thus, foundation funds can be enhanced from
the capitalization of its tax exemption.
3. The foundation can keep income in the family.
6 Berman, supra, note 1. A recent article speaks of foundations as "venture
capital," with no apparent sense of disturbance about the morality implicit
in that view. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility, 73 Harv. L. R. 433, 483 (1960). And see infra, note 9.
7 Note, Permissible Purposes for Non-Profit Corporations, 51 Col. L. R.
889, 898 (1951).
8 Berman, supra note 1. As to lack of government supervision, see, Karst
article supra n. 6, and discussion below.
9 Berman, supra note 1, and see supra note 4. See also, Flechner, Charitable
Foundations and their Benefits, 34 Nebr. L. R. 630, 631 (1955); Latchen,
Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implications, 98 U.
Pa. L. R. 617 (1950); Casey, How to Use Charitable Trusts and Foundations,
Handbook of Tax Techniques, 1011 at 1028 (1951).
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4. Family foundations can aid employees of the donor's
business.
5. Foundations may be the method of insuring that funds
will be available for use in new ventures in business.
6. We can avoid income from property while it is slowly
being given to a foundation by a combination of a trust
and the charitable foundation.
7. We can get the 20% charity deduction in other ways:
(a) By giving away appreciated property to the founda-
tion, we escape a tax on the realization of a gain.
(b) We can give funds to a foundation to get charitable
deduction currently in our most advantageous tax
year.
(c) Very often local personal and real property taxes can
be avoided.
(d) We can avoid speculative profits.
(e) We can give away valuable "frozen assets," white
elephant estates, residences, valuable works of art,
and collections of all sorts.
Plan of Typical Foundation
Just what is contained in the complete structure of a founda-
tion (e.g., its charter, by-laws, deed of trust, or etc.) would
require too much space to permit setting forth here. We can, how-
ever, set up an outline of the usual contents of such an instru-
ment. This will serve as our "typical plan"-the strawman
which we will proceed to pick apart.
In general terms, the deed of trust and/or articles of in-
corporation of a charitable foundation now typically provide as
follows: 10
1. Introductory formalities; the gifts; designations of trus-
tees, etc.
2. Declaration of purpose; or Purpose Clause (or clauses).
Dedicating the foundation to public welfare purposes in
general, and stated specific charitable purposes (often,
erroneously, for the benefit of employees-which is not
exempt for such small and private group purposes, tax-
wise).
3. Provisions for transfer of the founder's and other shares
of stock to the foundation, payment of dividends, etc. to it;
and also grants of funds, other property, etc. (Corporate
consent to provisions that affect corporate management,
by simple resolution, is strong supporting material).
10 For full sets of such articles see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and
Assns. (1956); 5 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law (Forms; 1960), now in
press. See also, Andrews, Legal Instruments of Foundations (1958).
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4. Trustees' powers, duties, limitations, succession, etc. (and
their covenants).
5. Provisions for managing the corporation or corporations
whose stock is turned over. (Again, corporate consents-
easy for a controlling shareholder to give-are em-
ployed).
6. Provisions for managing the foundation (often very
detailed).
7. Irrevocability provision.
8. Acceptance of trust or gift.
9. Miscellaneous provisions.
10. Severability clause.
11. Acknowledgments.
12. Schedule of endowment gifts (appendix).
13. Settlor's or Founder's Will, reaffirming the arrangement.
Sometimes the grant is made in the form of a deed of trust,
with instructions to incorporate later when that becomes de-
sirable. Sometimes the grant is made to a corporation specifically
organized to take it; or with instructions at once to organize a
corporation to take it. Either way, foundations set up substan-
tially as sketched in the foregoing "Plan" have been upheld by
the courts."
The View That Foundations Are Valid, Generally
The view that all foundations are valid unless clearly un-
lawful in their purposes (e.g., such as to foment revolution) is
usually supported by arguments such as the following: 12
It is axiomatic that charities are favorites of the law, and
courts will try to support a doubtful instrument in order to
sustain a charitable gift.'8 Valid portions will be sustained, while
invalid portions are severed. 14 Or equity courts will reform a
deed of trust in order to carry out the intent of the settlor when
he made a mistake. 15 Or they will freely allow him to amend
the instrument.16
11 In re Trust of Frederick C. Scholler, Orphans' Court of Philadelphia
County, Pa., No. 210 of 1959, decided Mar. 25, 1960, is the most recent
illustration known to the writer.
12 Based on the Attorney-General's brief in the Scholler decision, supra
note 11.
13 Kinike's Estate, 155 Pa. 101; Anderson Estate, 269 Pa. 535 (1921), Funk's
Estate, 353 Pa. 321 (1946).
14 Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 398 (2); Manners v. Philadelphia Library Co.,
93 Pa. 165, 174 (1880); In re Coxen, 1948 Ch. 747 (Engl.).
15 Irish v. Irish, 361 Pa. 410; Spiegel Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701
(1948); Miller v. National Bank, 38 N. W. 2d 863 (Mich., 1949); Flagg v.
Flagg, 80 D. & C. 544 (1952); Kunkel v. Kunkel, 267 Pa. 163, 172 (1920).
16 Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 367, Comment c; Par. 333, Comment (e).
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In addition it is argued that no member of the public nor
relative of the settlor has standing to attack the trust.17 Even
claims of legal heirs of the settlor are given little consideration
when they attack it. It is reasoned that abuses are correctable
only at the instance of the attorney-general.'8
Not only events contemporaneous with the establishment of
the foundation, but also subsequent events will be considered in
seeking to uphold the grant.19 General expressions of charitable
intent will prevail.20
If detailed control of business corporations is involved (i.e.,
sterilizing the board of directors, contrary to corporation law and
public policy), it is solely the attorney-general (not the court)
that may attack the grant.21 "If such provisions in the deed are
illegal, they do not avoid the trust." 22 (This last quotation, stated
by the Pennsylvania court so very recently, is extraordinary. It
seems to mean that practically no illegality is enough to make a
foundation illegal!)
The Real Problem of Abuse of the Foundation Device
Most discussions of foundations treat them as inherently
charitable uses (trusts) in nature, governed by trust law-which
tries to preserve charitable gifts almost at all costs. This means
that the old trust law is viewed as basic-law that crystallized
long before modern corporate or tax devices even existed. That
old law never knew the modern devices of close corporation con-
trol agreements, modern anti-trust policy, modern income tax
pressures, and above all modern corporate entity policies. Treat-
ment of foundations which are used as business devices thus has
consistently started with false premises-premises of trust law.
17 Weigand v. The Barnes Foundation, 374 Pa. 149, 97 A. 2d 81 (1950).
Is See, Scott, Trusts § 391, p. 2761 (2d ed., 1956); Tudor, Charitable Trusts
341 (5th ed., 1929); and see Murphy v. Dalton, 314 S. W. 2d 726 (Mo., 1958);
Gredig v. Sterling, 47 F. 2d 832 (5th Cir., 1931), cert. den. 284 U. S. 629;
Stoner Mfg. Corp. v. Y. M. C. A., 13 Ill. 2d 162, 148 N. E. 2d 441 (1948);
Claim of Art Institute of Chicago, 16 Ill. App. 2d 84, 147 N. E. 2d 415 (1958);
In re Vassar's Estate, 27 N. E. 394 (N. Y., 1891); Trustees of Alexander
Linn Hospital Assn. v. Richman, 46 N. J. Super. 594, 135 A. 2d 221 (1957);
Anno., 124 A. L. R. 1237. But see State ex rel. Tennessee Children's Home
Soc. v. Hollinsworth, 193 Tenn. 491, 246 S. W. 2d 345 (1952), that district
attys. have the power; and Hedin v. Westala Luth. Church, 59 Idaho 241,
250, 81 P. 2d 741, 745 (1938), that an interested party has the power. And
cases still in the courts are Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.
E. 2d 511 (1955), Mass. Supr. Jud. Ct. Equity No. 68735, and the Scholler
case, supra note 11, for which the 3 month period for commencing appeal
has not yet expired as of the date of this writing.
19 Scholler case, supra note 11, at p. 2.
20 Scholler case, supra note 11, at p. 3.
21 Scholler case, supra note 11, at p. 4, and note 18.
22 Scholler case, supra note 11, at 4; citing Manners v. Phila. Library Co.,
supra note 14.
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Moreover, the mixture of trust, corporation and tax law makes
for involved and tortuous reasoning in case decisions.
In the interpretation of any trust, charitable or otherwise,
the polestar is the intent of the settlor as defined by the language
he used.23
Usually the instrument involved is long and complex and
must be considered in its entirety in order to understand its real
purpose. Although concededly there are many cases which have
held that instruments are to be construed liberally in order to sus-
tain a charitable gift,24 a reading of the modern foundation instru-
ment often results in the inevitable conclusion that many parts
are self-serving statements designed to protect and disguise the
fact that the settlor intended the trust to be non-charitable in op-
eration. If the court sustains such trusts, it gives blanket approval
to non-charitable perpetuities so long as they are accompanied by
minimal apparent charitable incidents and lip-service to charity.
Truly charitable trusts enjoy a special status in our society,
justified because they perform valuable services for the com-
munity, and thereby decrease the general tax burden. The case of
Bennet Estate25 emphasized this very point 26 thus:
... charitable trusts perform some public functions which a
governmental body should perform . . . deducting money
from the charitable trust for tax purposes, which would then
be applied to the same or some other charitable use, would
only result in a waste of funds because the process of collect-
ing taxes is costly...
However, only true charities have any claim to this special
status. Since purported charities are often of substantial benefit
to the creator under our tax laws, the temptation to accomplish
private ends by the establishment of a trust, labelled a "charity,"
is great. If, in fact, it is not a charity, the result is to grant the
tax benefit to the grantor without any corresponding benefit to
the community.
Use of "charitable" foundations as devices for evasion of tax
and corporation law long has been viewed with growing alarm
by many authorities. So widespread has this abuse become that
a recent work on corporation law in straight faced seriousness
devotes an entire chapter to use of "charitable" foundations as a
type of business organization.27 The same work elsewhere goes
23 Britt Estate, 369 Pa. 450, 455 (1952).
24 E.g., Anderson Estate, and Funk's Estate, supra, note 13.
25 18 D. & C. 2d 595 (0. C. Luz., Pa., 1959).
26 Id. at 609. But there must be an actual, and direct, benefit to the public,
to justify classification as a charity with all the privileges of that status.
Massachusetts Medical Society v. Assessors of Boston, 164 N. E. 2d 325(Mass. 1960). Compare with this the view that taxation is better than
private beneficence, fiscally and for reducing inequality: Wedgwood, The
Economics of Inheritance 91 (1920).
27 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, chap. 14 (1958), and see other such
"hard-boiled" approaches, supra notes 4, 9.
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on to say: "A growing and useful device for controlling funds of
a closely held business, while minimizing the tax strain, exists in
the creation of tax-exempt corporations (or trusts) and founda-
tions." 28 Again, it quotes: "A motive at least equal to that of
providing a suitable mechanism for philanthropy and tax free
reservoir for an otherwise highly taxable income is the power
which the foundation gives to the controller of a business or in-
dustry to perpetuate his control." 29 It then adds30 that the foun-
dation also is used as "a relatively new method of voting control
.. .peculiarly adaptable to the closely held family corporation
.. .dependent upon the stock structure of the corporation .. .
(and also as) a vehicle for the accumulation of capital . .. (and
so on)." 31
Few better examples of the abuses adverted to above can be
found than the typical plan of a charitable foundation outlined
above. The tax law objections to such a trust pale when com-
pared with the utter perversion of corporation law which it em-
bodies. Of the tax and general corporation aspects, it may suffice
to refer to the Pennsylvania Non-Profit Corporation Law,
3 2
which provides that activities of a non-profit corporation must
result in no pecuniary profit "incidental or otherwise, to its mem-
bers." 33 Incorporation of such a trust is thus more dangerous
than operation without incorporating, under Pennsylvania and
other states' statutes, as it invites scrutiny and probable rejection.
A trust device often therefore seeks to do indirectly what cannot
be done directly. The tax benefits to the settlor and his family,
alone, under the guise of "charitable" tax exemption, are obvious,
not to mention the other obvious incidental benefits.34 During the
28 Id., Vol. 2, at 104 (1959); cf., Liggett, "Comment in panel discussion
before Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report," in Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability (Dec.,
1955).
29 2 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law 632 (1959); cf., Friedman, Corporate
Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 Colum. L. R. 155
(1957).
30 3 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law § 1471 (1959).
31 For an extensive bibliography of articles on "charitable trusts and
corporations," see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Assns., 333-334(1956), and supra notes 3, 4, 9.
32 15 Pa. St., Sec. 2851-2.
33 In re Incorporation of Automatic Phonograph Owners Assn., 45 D. & C.
551 (C. P. Phila., 1942); In re Fayette Gasoline Retailers Assn., 32 D. & C.
165 (C. P. Fayette, 1938); see also, Eaton, Charitable Foundations, Tax
Avoidance, and Business Expediency, 35 Va. L. R. 809, 987 (1949).
34 See, Commissioner, v. Edw. Orton Jr. Ceramic Foundation, 173 F. 2d
488 (6th Cir., 1949), affg. 9 T. C. 533 (upholding a foundation that gave
income to the testator's wife for 5 years); Randall Foundation, Inc. v.
Riddell, 244 F. 2d 804 (9th Cir., 1957) (Unreasonable accumulation of
income); Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (D. C. Ala., 1946),
appeal dism. 181 F. 2d 9 (5th Cir., 1950) (upholding benefits to the founder's
(Continued on next page)
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life of the settlor the trust often is, in fact, no more than a personal
holding company.
The House of Lords in Great Britain recently pointed out
that an unreasonable extension of the kinds of transfers which
will gain the benefits and privileges of a charity will only result
in making available these privileges to private parties for private
or selfish ends without any public benefit. This would be a total
perversion of the concept of charity. The Law Lords said in
Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co.: 3
It must not, I think, be forgotten that charitable institutions
enjoy rare and increasing privileges, and that the claim to
come within the privileged class should be clearly estab-
lished. (Emphasis added)
This is not to say that a true charity should be denied the
status of a charity simply because of a technical error in drafts-
manship. It does mean that a trust which clearly is intended to
benefit a limited, specific class of persons and a few selected busi-
ness corporations, does not conform to or even approximate the
mould of a charity. Therefore it should not receive the privileges
of a charity.
Violation of Corporation Law by Foundations
The basic concepts of corporate entity and directors' control
usually are the legal principles most thoroughly violated by the
use of foundations as business devices. It is axiomatic that public
policy requires that a corporation be an entity distinct from its
shareholders, and managed and governed by its board of di-
rectors (who often even are actually denominated "trustees").30
This fundamental public policy is declared by statute in most
states.3 7 Only in a small, private "incorporated partnership busi-
ness" is this principle sometimes varied, when no one but the
"partners" will be affected.
"Sterilization" of the board of directors of a corporation is
strictly forbidden, as a host of statutes and decisions make crystal
(Continued from preceding page)
sister-$15,000 yr. salary from earnings or corpus); Otto T. Mallery v. Com-
missioner, 40 B. T. A. 778 (1939) (upholding benefits to a needy relative);
Estate of Agnes C. Robinson, 1 T. C. 19 (1942) (upholding benefits to family
servants); Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 706 (2d Cir., 1938) (up-
holding benefits to employees of the founder's corporation). But note that
such free and easy personal use has been limited by the Revenue Act of
1950 and Int. Rev. Code of 1954- §§ 501(c) (3), 503(c).
35 (1951) A. C. 297, (1951) 1 All. E. R. 31, 34.
36 Ray v. Homewood Hospital, 223 Minn. 440, 27 N. W. 2d 409 (1947), that
the (trustees) directors must direct; and, Ashman v. Miller, 101 F. 2d 85
(6 Cir., 1939); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E.
138 (1912).
37 See list of statutes in 2 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, Chap. 39 (1959),
including N. J. Rev. St. Ann. Sec. 14:7-1; Pa. (Purdon's) St., tit. 15, Sec.
2852-401.
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clear. Preemption of the essential powers of the directors, by a
stockholders' agreement or by any other device (such as a foun-
dation) is unlawful. 38 A relation of directors to majority stock-
holders in which the directors are mere puppets in a "puppet-
puppeteer" situation is improper and contrary to public policy.
39
Statutes and cases permitting stockholders to limit the powers
of directors to manage the corporation, in the case of an incorpo-
rated partnership, do not change the basic public policy as to
control of corporate affairs by directors.40 Such a revolutionary
change of public policy as permits stockholders .to manage the
corporation, as has been adopted in Puerto Rico (by incorpora-
tion of eleven or less shareholders, who will exercise the powers
of directors) is for the legislature alone to decide.4 1 No other
jurisdiction has yet seen fit to adopt such a policy for small "in-
corporated partnerships," let alone corporations generally.4 2 Yet
such "trusts" or "corporate foundations" repeatedly seek indi-
rectly to vest management control of several corporations (not
merely one) in the stockholder-trust, in perpetuity.
In such a "trust instrument," the cumulative effect of the
provisions in violation of corporation law and principles some-
times is almost breathtaking. Taken page by page, they may
add up as follows:
"Voting trust" type provisions, ordinarily limited by statutes to a
ten year maximum duration, often are perpetual in effect;
nor is the "voting trust" open to other stockholders as the
law ordinarily requires.
Control of salaries, a major power of corporate directors, is taken
from them-a "sterilizing" provision.
Control of bonuses and/or profit sharing, a major power of cor-
porate directors, is taken from them-a "sterilizing" provi-
sion.
"Compulsory" contributions by the corporations to the "founda-
tion," normally a major management decision for directors,
are effectively forced on them-a "sterilizing" provision.
Control of stock transfer or sale, a major aspect of directors'
managerial power, is taken from them-a "sterilizing" pro-
vision.
38 Long-Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N. Y. 174,
77 N. E. 2d 633 (1948); Abbey v. Meyerson, 274 A. D. 389, 83 N. Y. S. 2d
503, affd. without opinion 299 N. Y. 557, 85 N. E. 2d 789 (1949); Ray case,
supra n. 36; Note, The Charitable Corporation, 64 Harv. L. R. 1168, 1175
(1951).
39 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F. 2d 36 (3 Cir., 1947); cases supra n. 38.
40 Long-Park case, supra note 38 and Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements
in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale L. J. 1040 (1950); Hoban, Voting
Control Methods, 1958 Univ. of 111. L. F. (1) 110; 2 Oleck, Modem Cor-
poration Law, Chap. 39 (1959) (digests of statutes of all states).
41 Puerto Rico Gen. Corp. L. (1956) tit. 14, Sec. 501.
42 See 3 Oleck, supra, note 40, Chap. 57, listing digests of voting control
statutes of all American jurisdictions, and several Canadian ones.
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Domination of corporation management, articles of incorpora-
tion, and by-laws, are taken from directors, for the "trust"-
a "sterilizing" provision.
Power to decide on "unusual" outlays, purchases, debts, invest-
ments, and salary increases, all distinctly management pow-
ers of directors, are taken from them-a series of "steriliz-
ing" provisions.
Control of annual audit and loan powers, which also are in-
herently directors' managerial decisions, are effectively taken
from directors-a "sterilizing" provision.
Removal and replacement of directors who dare to independently
exercise their lawful management powers, fundamental
rights and duties, are taken over by the "trust"-not merely
a "sterilizing," but actually an "emasculating" provision.
Control of corporate subsidiaries, a basic power of directors, is
taken from them-a "sterilizing" provision.
And all these inherent powers of corporate management
sometimes are taken from the corporations and their boards of di-
rectors without even pretense of corporate agreement to the
emasculation of the corporate powers of each affected corpora-
tion. Such supine submission by the corporations' respective
boards of directors, of course, warrants (but rarely results in)
quo warranto action by the Secretary of State or Attorney
General. Law and public policy are for legislatures and courts
to declare-not to be written by any individual as he happens to
desire them to be at any time or for any personal motive or pur-
pose. If such a "trust" is permitted to stand, there is no corpora-
tion law, and we might as well junk all the corporation statutes
and decisions so painfully built up for a century and a half.
Domination of one corporation (let alone several) by a share-
holder or other outside "owner," if so complete that the corpo-
ration "had . . . no separate mind, will or existence of its own,"
requires disregard of the corporate entity. 43 "One-man incorpo-
ration," where it is allowed4 4 represents a legislative change of
policy, for corporations, and subject to corporation law regula-
tion, not for one-man-trust-operation of several corporations.
Use of corporate entity to defeat governmental policy will be
struck down.45 Such attempts usually involve a close or one-man
corporation.40 If the corporation is "a mere agent, or instru-
43 Lowendahl v. B. & 0. R. Co., 247 A. D. 144, 287 N. Y. S. 62 (1936), affd.
272 N. Y. 360, 6 N. E. 2d 56 (1936), rearg. den. 273 N. Y. 584, 7 N. E. 2d
704 (1937).
44 Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 491; Ky. Rev. St. 271.025; Mich. Comp. L. Sec. 450.3;
Wis. Stat. Ann. Sect. 180.44.
45 Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed.
679 (1904) ("mere instrumentality," tax case); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 38 S. Ct. 540, 62 L. Ed. 1142 (1918) (tax case).
46 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 60 S. Ct. 355, 84 L. Ed. 406 (1940).
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mentality or department" of the "owner," and is used to evade a
statute, the court will look through the form to see the real sub-
stance.47 And mere stock-ownership control may suffice for such
purpose, though ordinarily not fatal in itself.
48
Reasons Why Abuses Are Tolerated
All this is basic corporation law. Why then have attorneys-
general as well as the tax and other courts permitted
abuse of the concept of "charity" and misuse of corporation
principles and law to accomplish purposes improper under that
law? We submit that some of the reasons are these: (1) Solici-
tude for truly charitable projects has permitted gradual and
deliberate confusion of the concept of what is truly a charitable
organization. (2) Corporate management and "owners" have
persistently employed highly skilled (and paid) counsel to
achieve "owners'" purposes, with no adequate counterbalancing
force to protect the interests and viewpoints of the public. A
statement is attributed to Elihu Root that: "The client never
wants to be told he can't do what he wants to do, and it is the
lawyer's business to tell him how." This may be apocryphal, but
there is a core of truth in it-as witness the typical foundation
plan outlined above. (3) Treasury Department investigators are
usually accountants rather than lawyers, and assistant attorneys-
general are lawyers rather than accountants; both being out of
their depth in matters involving corporation law as well as tax
and trust law and complex accounting practices.
Motive as the Chief Test
Certainly, deliberate abuse of legal classification should be
held to a minimum.4 9 "Classification . . . as 'charitable' rather
than as 'for profit' depends on the actual nature of its activities
rather than on its name, purpose clause or other formal indicia
of character." 50
"Motive as the test. When ethical, moral or social motives
are the dominant ones in an enterprise, that enterprise is non-
profit ... If an enterprise is to be viewed as non-profit, it is not
enough that it merely subordinate the profit motive. It must
47 United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. 760
(1920); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual, 51 Harv. L. R. 1373 (1938).
48 Corsican Bank v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 68, 40 S. Ct. 82, 64 L. Ed. 141 (1919).
49 Lightfoot v. Poindexter, 199 S. W. 1152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
50 1 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, 15 (1958); cf., Gilbert v. McLeon
Infirmary, 219 S. C. 174, 64 S. E. 2d 524 (1951); Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N. J.
Super. 558, 72 A. 2d 371 (1950); Kubik v. American Composers Alliance,
Inc., 54 N. Y. S. 2d 764 (1945); In re Estate of Bailey, 19 Cal. App. 2d 135,
65 P. 2d 102 (1937); Federal Chem. Co. v. Paddock, 264 Ky. 338, 94 S. W.
2d 645 (1936). For the broader view of what is "private charity" see, Karst,
The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,
73 Harv. L. R. 433, n. 2 (1960).
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entirely eliminate profit-making from its basic purposes . . .
(Though) it is not necessary that profit be eliminated from all
the activities of an organization . . ." 51 "The fact that a corpo-
ration or association styles itself as a non-profit organization does
not make it one." 52 "Some tax experts have utterly confused the
very real distinction between charity or public-benefit purposes
and merely not-for-profit purposes (not to mention business pur-
poses). Naturally, such a confusion of terms and purposes is
highly desirable for tax avoidance, but it is also highly un-
desirable from the point of view of society." 53
Of course, the testing of such a complex device as the modern
foundation with the acid reagent of motive is a very difficult task
for an attorney general or for a court. It is much easier to point
to a statute, tax regulation, or case decision, and comfortably to
rest on that. Application of fundamental principles (e.g., the
principle and public policy of "corporate entity" and of manage-
ment by a board of directors) is far more difficult than that. It
is all too easy to say that there are abuses but that the legislature
should deal with them, not the courts. But how many legislators
understand the complexities of corporation, tax and trust law and
finance? And how many people can or will sacrifice time, effort
and money to counter the lobbying of paid (and/or "interested")
professional persuaders of legislation?
I submit that it is time to call a halt to the misuse of cor-
porations, trusts, and "foundations" for ostensibly charitable but
actually private business purposes. This national scandal is a
symptom of moral rot, too long tolerated. Use of a simulacrum-
of a pious form-to conceal the real inner motive of power grasp-
ing, with cynical disregard of public policy and welfare, must be
checked, before this Nation degenerates into a society governed by
hypocrisy-with one law for the rich and "clever" and another
law for the poor and simple. Just for example, the clause in the
typical plan (above) that speaks of "severability" is a minor but
pointed illustration. "Severability" is a typical modem "boiler-
plate" clause found in legal form books. It sometimes says (to
those not bemused by form and ritual), in real effect: "I know
that this instrument is illegal and improper in some respects, and
wish to save what can be saved if and when the illegalities are ex-
posed and rejected." When the whole instrument is a tissue of
concealed (and improper) motives and provisions, as it some-
times is, that clause points up the utter cynicism of the entire
instrument.
51 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations 1 (1956); and Penna.
Stat. Ann., tit. 15, Sec. 2851-2 (1938).
52 Oleck, supra note 51, at 3.
53 Oleck, supra note 51, at 6. And see, Massachusetts Medical Soc. v. As-
sessors of Boston, 164 N. E. 2d 325 (Mass. 1960), that merely indirect bene-
fits to the public from a medical society do not suffice to warrant recognition
as a "charity," and tax exemption.
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The epidemic hypocrisy of the kind of "foundations" that
piously proclaim themselves to be "charities" but that actually
are intricate devices to evade and pervert the basic law of the
land-typified in the plan outlined above-must be cured, by a
court with the intestinal fortitude to declare that such fraudulent
devices no longer will be tolerated. A hypocritical foundation is
a pious fraud.
Illegality and Unseverability of "Business Foundation" Trust
Purpose Clauses
"In the sense of legal or formal organization of a non-profit
group the word purpose has a special meaning, identical to the
meaning of that word in corporation law." 54 Statutes in almost
all States require that non-profit corporations or associations shall
state in their articles a definite purpose or purposes.55
A "trust instrument" includes any form of grant or devise for
charitable or public purposes.56 This indicates that most states
can apply the non-profit corporation law to any non-profit or-
ganization which in effect amounts to a corporate group.
"For a non-profit organization, the very approval of incor-
poration depends largely on the purpose clause . . . The purpose
clauses give public notice of the nature of the organization for
those who deal with it. They also indicate to the corporation (or
foundation) directors (or trustees) . . . their proper activi-
ties . . . Vagueness may result in refusal of approval. And de-
ceptiveness may result in withdrawal of approval after it has been
granted . . ." 57 "Approval of incorporation usually will be re-
fused if the purposes stated in a proposed charter are contradic-
tory." 58
In other words, purpose clauses are supposed to tell the pub-
lic authorities, the members, the officers and trustees or direc-
tors, creditors, and other persons, precisely what the organiza-
tion is authorized to do and what it is not authorized to do.59
The typical "business foundation's" deed of trust, or purpose
clause often states a bewildering variety of vague objects and
purposes, ranging from "alleviation of poverty" to any "charitable
purposes as in the discretion of the trustees may seem desirable."
In the bargain it sometimes specifies the purpose of providing
hospital, medical, educational, etc. facilities for employees of the
54 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations, Sec. 39 (1956); cf., 6
Fletcher, Cyc. Law of Private Corporations, Sec. 2475 (perm. ed.); Oleck,
N. Y. Corporations, Chap. 17 (1954 with 1959 cum. supp.).
55 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Anno., tit. 15, Chap. 49A, Secs. 2851-1 et seq.; Deer-
ing's Calif. Rev. Statutes, tit. 3, Part I, Secs. 21,000-21,401; Del. Code Anno.,
tit. 8; Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat., Chap. 32, Secs. 163a-163 a 100; N. Y.
Memb. Corp. Law, Art. II; etc.
56 Pa. Stat. 2851-2.
57 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations Sec. 41 (1956).
58 Id. Sec. 42.
59 1 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law 864 (1958).
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corporation(s) (which today is invalid for tax exemption). Often
the purposes are stated as follows:
In general, without in any way restricting the charitable pur-
poses for which this grant may be distributed, for the allevia-
tion of poverty, distress and destitution, for the promotion
of scientific research, especially research in the various
branches of enameling, for assistance to persons under a
physical or mental disability, for enabling needy and worthy
students to obtain college educations, for the benefit of
schools, colleges, institutes, universities, asylums, churches,
and hospitals, and for such other charitable purposes as in
the discretion of the trustees may seem desirable, the dis-
tribution to be world-wide in scope.
Such a purpose clause often begins with the sweeping ob-
Ject of "alleviation of poverty and destitution." Then it oddly
includes scientific research especially in enameling or some other
specific subject (e.g., the founder's business), provides for aid to
physically handicapped persons, for grants to needy college stu-
dents, and then for gifts to colleges and universities and churches
and hospitals. Then in a final burst of generosity it often provides
also for "such other charitable purposes as in the discretion of
the trustees may seem desirable." Finally, carried away by its
own nobility, the purpose clause often states that such assistance
is to be world-wide in range, and not merely confined to the
United States and its one hundred and eighty million people.
Not even such vast foundations as the Ford, Rockfeller,
Carnegie, or other foundations of enormous endowment claim
such universal objects and purposes. In truth such a purpose
clause amounts to reductio ad absurdum of a non-profit founda-
tion's purpose clause. Where found, it is sheer hogwash, and
patently so. Obviously the draftsman there threw in "everything
but the kitchen sink," on the theory that if you are going to
create a smoke screen, you may as well create a thick one.
The law is well settled in all jurisdictions that the purpose
clause of a certificate of incorporation or deed of trust is illegal
unless it states precisely what the purpose is. A provision in
effect "to do anything noble that the trustees desire to do" is im-
proper and invalid. A vague purpose clause is the traditional
cloak for the hiding of real purpose. If the purpose clause is so
vague that it does not precisely state what is to be done, and
by implication thus what is not to be done, that purpose clause
is illegal and must be rejected.60
A typical statute61 states that articles of incorporation must
set forth "a precise and accurate statement of the purpose or
60 The Pennsylvania State Sportsmen's Association, 11 C. C. 576, 4 Dauph.
229 (1892), In re Council for Small Business, Inc., 155 N. Y. S. 2d 530 (1956);
2 Op. N. Y. Atty. Gen. (1911) 69; Op. N. Y. Atty. Gen. (May 14, 1940);
Op. N. Y. Atty. Gen. (June 6, 1952).
61 Pa. Stat. See. 2851-203(3).
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purposes for which it is to be formed." The statement must be
definite and exact.62 Application for a non-profit charter may be
refused if purposes stated are so unrelated as to fall within dif-
ferent clauses of the statute.0 3 A charter may not be granted for
purposes which are distinct and unrelated to each other inter
sese.
6 4
The typical "business foundation" purpose clause falls di-
rectly under the ban of the law above cited. This is just as true
of a "charitable trust" as of any other non-profit corporation.
The deed of trust usually speaks of incorporation, and as earlier
pointed out, consists of what amounts to a corporation without
benefit of corporate form. The purported "purpose clause" then
is truly seen as nothing more than a mass of unrelated, noble-
sounding, glittering generalities, none of which is necessarily the
real purpose actually intended by the settlor.
It should be pointed out that fraudulent statement of pur-
pose, or the misleading of supervisory authorities is a serious
crime in many states.6 5 In a number of states special approvals
by supervisory authorities must be obtained for many "public
welfare" activities. Thus hospital-type aid must be approved by
the Department of Health in Pennsylvania, and by the State
Board of Social Welfare in New York; hospital-expense aid must
be approved by those agencies and also by the Commissioner of
Insurance in both states. 6 Public assistance and funds must be
supervised by state authorities. 67 Many of the purposes stated
in the usual business foundation instrument are "public wel-
fare" in nature (as well as being utterly inconsistent and con-
tradictory) and must be approved and supervised by various
public authorities. No incorporation ordinarily is permitted, for
example, for an organization which will merely duplicate the
work already being done by another non-profit organization. 8
The requirement of non-profit purpose approval by super-
visory authorities is illustrated in Pennsylvania by the require-
ment of basic approval, besides that of the secretary of state,
by the Court of Common Pleas of the County where the registered
62 In re Application for Jocard Club, 85 D. & C. 88 (1954); Citizens League
of Wheatfield Tp., 65 D. & C. 70 (1949); In re Betz, Jr., Voters League, 21
D. & C. 357 (1934).
63 Pa. Stat. Sec. 2851-201. Charter Application, 21 Dist. 1135, 8 Sch. 179
(1912).
64 In re Charter of Evangelical Lutheran Church, 4 Del. 154 (1892); Pa.
State Sportsmen's Association, supra, note 60.
65 N. Y. Penal Law, Sec. 660, 661 (ten year prison term).
66 Pa. St., Secs. 2851-219, 2851-317; N. Y. Memb. Corp. Law, Secs. 11(1),
11(1-b).
67 In re Gold Star Parents Association, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 73 (1946).
68 In re Gold Star Parents Association, supra; In re Boy Explorers of
America, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 108 (1946); In re Victory Committee of Greenpoint,
59 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (1945); In re Certificate of Incorporation of Humanity
Club, 155 N, Y, S, 2d 210 (1956).
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office is to be located.6 9 So, too, approval of educational organi-
zations is vested in the Superintendent of Public Instruction. 70
And so on. Thus, by avoiding incorporation of our typical "per-
sonal and perpetual holding company," avoidance of any super-
vision by the public authorities is attempted. If this device is
sustained, anybody may avoid all statutory supervision of "pub-
lic welfare" activities simply by not incorporating. Obviously,
if such a "purpose clause" were submitted, in advance, to a court
experienced with non-profit organizations and to the several state
agencies concerned with specific approvals and supervision, it
would receive short shrift.
Non-profit organizations for the benefit of employees of a cer-
tain company or companies only (besides being not tax exempt)
must obtain special approval of the proper state supervisory au-
thority (e.g., Board of Standards and Appeals in New York).71
Actual purpose (motive), rather than the purpose stated is
the real test of legality of purpose.7 2 And the state may challenge
any corporation or foundation for grasping more powers than it
is authorized to use.7 3
Thus on many separate counts the usually all-embracing
"purpose clause" of the "business foundation" is improper and
void. Were such a clause to be sustained it would in practical
effect authorize the trustees to do very nearly anything they
please with the funds. For example, as has been shown above, a
friend or relative might be granted aid at will under the "allevia-
tion of poverty and destitution" purpose. A grant to the trustee
himself conceivably might be authorized, at the will of the trus-
tees, as a charitable purpose which "in the discretion of the trus-
tees may seem desirable." Without laboring the point, it is clear
that what we would have is not a charitable "purpose clause,"
but in fact a carte blanche to the trustees (who may be the settlor
and his family) to do with the trust funds whatever they wish.
So broad and vague a purpose is not only illegal, but it verges
on the immoral.
Courts Must Stop Abuse of the "Charitable Foundation" Whether
or Not Attorneys-General Act
Statutes in practically every state give to the state's attorney-
general the power, and duty, to challenge misuse of corporate or
other organization authority. Quo warranto proceedings may and
69 Pa. Stat., Secs. 2851-205, 2851-207.
70 Id., See. 2851-211.
71 Wilson v. Picard, 173 Misc. 788, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 119 (1940).
72 Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 93 F. 2d 360 (1st Cir. 1937); Cummins-
Collins Foundation, 15 T. C. 613, 622 (1950); Trinity Operating Co. v.
Corsi, 269 A. D. 716, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 744 (1945); Kubik v. American Com-
posers Alliance, Inc., 54 N. Y. S. 2d 764 (1945).
73 Syracuse Savings Bank v. Yorkshire Insurance Co., 301 N. Y. 403; 94
N. E. 2d 73 (1950); Note, Distinction Between Powers and Objects in
Articles of Incorporation, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 (1933).
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should be brought by the attorney-general to vacate, revoke or
annul the charter of a corporation or other organization guilty of
improper conduct, or neglect or failure to use its powers, or use
of unauthorized powers. Such action may be based on the at-
torney-general's own information and volition, or on the com-
plaint of a private person.4 Thus the New York Civil Practice
Act 75 says: "The attorney-general may maintain an action upon
his own information or upon the complaint of a private person."
State administrative officers or agencies, other than the at-
torney-general, also may initiate proceedings based on improper
conduct or abuse of the real functions of public-welfare type or-
ganizations.7 6
Courts themselves, of their own motions (sua sponte) may
act summarily when perversion or willful disregard of corporate
propriety occurs.77
In the typical device, not one but several corporations may
be violating the principles and provisions of corporation and
other statutes, while the "foundation" makes complete mockery
of them. Yet the attorney-general usually does nothing. Instead,
simply assuming this to be merely a question of trust law, he
74 Pa. St. Secs. 2852-1112, 1107; D. C. Publ. L. 389, c. 269 Sec. 7 (1954);
Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 23, Sec. 120; Ore. L. 1953, c. 549 Sec. 6; Wis. St.
(1953) Sec. 180.06; Ohio Rev. Code (1954) Sec. 1701.11(D); Calif. Ann. Civ.
Code Secs. 345, 404b; A. B. A. Model Bus. Corp. Act Secs. 6, 51; Del. Corp.
L. Sec. 68; N. Y. Gen. Corp. L. Secs. 90 et seq.; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act Sec.
1217; etc. See, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Assns. Sec. 229 (1956),
citing many cases and statutes; and see, Com. ex rel. Truscott v. Yiddisher
Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 116 A. 2d 555 (1955); Southerland ex rel.
Snider v. Decimo Club, Inc., 16 Del. Ch. 183, 142 A. 786 (1928); People
v. Stilwell, 157 A. D. 839, 142 N. Y. S. 881 (1913), affg. 78 Misc. 96, 138
N. Y. S. 693 (misuse of powers); Nicolai v. Maryland Agric. & Mech. Assn.,
96 Md. 323, 53 A. 965 (1903) (misuse of powers); State v. Dyer, 200 S. W.
2d 813 (Tex. 1947) (misuse of powers); Bennett v. American-Canadian
Ambulance Corps., 179 Misc. 21, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 470 (1942) (misuse for
profit); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 4 S. Ct. 437, 28 L. Ed. 482 (1884);
State ex rel. Johnson v. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn., 143 Nebr. 805,
11 N. W. 2d 89, 92 (1943); Aitken v. Stewart, 129 Calif. App. 38, 18 P. 2d
988 (1933); Syracuse Savings Bank v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 301 N. Y. 403,
94 N. E. 2d 73 (1950); Red Ball Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Southern Pacific
Trans. Co., 231 S. W. 2d 462 (Tex. 1950); 35 Words and Phrases, Quo War-
ranto (1960 Cum Supp. ed.).
75 Sec. 1217. See also statutes requiring reports from trustees of charities,
such as N. H. Rev. St. Ann. §§ 7:19-32 (1955); Ohio Rev. Code §§ 109.23-99
(1953); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12 §§ 8A-I (1958); Calif. St. 1959, ch. 1258 § 1
adopting permanently 9C Unif. L. Ann. 208-15 (1957).
76 Pa. St. Secs. 2851-1005, 1307; N. Y. Gen. Corp. L. Sec. 130; Walker
Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders, 173 Misc. 455, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 842,
affd. without op. 259 A. D. 1010, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 512, revd. on other gds. 285
N. Y. 462, 35 N. E. 2d 42, rehear, den. 286 N. Y. 607, 35 N. E. 2d 944 (1941).
77 People v. Volunteer Rescue Army, Inc., 262 A. D. 237, 28 N. Y. S. 2d
994, affd. without op. 39 N. Y. S. 2d 1022 (1943); Com. ex rel. Truscott v.
Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 116 A. 2d 555 (1955); Morrison v.
Philadelphia College of Law, Inc., 56 Dauph. 265; Kardo Co. v. Adams, 231
F. 950 (C. C. A. 6, 1916); 19 C. J. S., Corporations, Sec. 1651.
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may even assume it to be valid, with hardly a glance at the grave
questions underlying the "trust."
The attorney-general generally fails to recognize that the
real issue in such a case is the propriety of the establishment of
this "trust," not the propriety of its administration.
This, of course, is breathtakingly wrong. But the reason for
such egregious error is plain. The attorney-general usually de-
votes his attention (if any is given at all) to the trust law ap-
plicable to a valid charitable trust. He generally ignores the
real problems of corporation law, tax law, administrative law,
accounting practice, and the root problem-cynical use of the
charitable trust device to evade taxes, to violate corporation law,
to evade required state agency supervision, and to control a
holding-company complex of corporations in perpetuity from
the grave. The attorney-general often merely assumes (as above
remarked) that under general principles of construction the
"trust deed" should be sustained as a charitable gift. Rarely does
an attorney-general indicate awareness of the vital question of a
founder's ultimate purpose in setting up the "foundation," even
with himself and his relatives as "trustees."
Sometimes an attorney-general will say that if the trust was
invalid and void ab initio, the irrevocability clause falls with the
rest of the trust and the trustees held the assets on a construc-
tive trust for the settlor. This is even more than the boldest user
of a foundation as a personal holding company would dare to
hope for. It means that if what he does is declared illegal, his
purpose still will be accomplished by a constructive trust-with
himself again the trustee, constructively. As Alice in Wonder-
land said: "Curioser and curioser."
But the most obnoxious error of all is the argument (re-
ferred to above) that "no member of the public or relative of
the settlor of a valid charitable trust has standing to question
the administration of the trust." 7 Here, too, there is the
gratuitous assumption that use of a foundation as a business de-
vice is ipso facto a valid charitable trust. Then it is argued that
abuses of discretion in the administration of charitable trusts are
correctable only at the instance of the Attorney General.
The real issue is not the propriety of administration, but the
propriety of establishment. Moreover, the law is that any in-
terested person, or the Court itself, may question the legality
of use or abuse of corporate powers, as has been shown above.
For that matter, a Court of Equity has inherent power to correct
improper results of the use of rules of law.79
Taking the kindest possible view, the attitude of some as-
sistant attorneys-general may be attributed to sheer bewilderment
and lack of thorough understanding of what really is being done.
78 See the citations, supra note 17.
79 Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 Fordham L. Rev.
23-44 (1951).
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After all, the problem of misuse of the concept of charitable
foundations is one of the most complicated and intricate of all
fields of law, finance and business. It involves corporation law,
law of charities, trust law, tax law state and federal, administra-
tive law, accounting procedures, practice and procedure law,
high finance and more. The use of foundations as business devices
has been carefully developed by some of the most astute cor-
poration and tax lawyers in the nation over a period of years.
Misuse has been grounded on creation of such elaborate devices
as to confuse and baffle all but the most thoroughly experienced
and learned legal minds.
Viewing the attitude of so many attorneys-general from
another aspect, a practical factor that must influence that attitude
becomes apparent. After all, if the attorney-general's office is
sensitively aware of its duties respecting misuse of corporations
and foundations, it will investigate such abuses itself. But we all
know that attorneys-general generally have avoided involve-
ment with these complex problems. For one thing, their offices
almost all lack adequate personnel or budgets for this additional
burden. For another, they usually scrutinize the operation of the
foundation rather than its establishment. There are few cases in
which any attorney-general directly attacked the validity of a
foundation as a business device. This, despite the clear mandate
and duty to prevent abuses, referred to in the statutes of so many
states. The interested founders, the trustees, trust companies, and
the attorneys for all of these, usually are powerful and able-not
given to unquestioning submission to control. Pressure and in-
fluence have been known to have been used by a few of them.
Nobody likes to be told what he may or may not do with his own
property, and also many attorneys-general are politicians, or they
never become attorneys-general.
With all compassion for the dilemma of attorneys-general
offices, we nevertheless cannot submit to further abuse of the
law by amoral devices simply out of sympathy for the bewilder-
ment of attorneys-general (in fact actually assistant attorneys-
general, usually) who are out of their depth or beyond their fa-
cility capacities in these legal maelstroms. The tax-free, corpora-
tion-law-flouting "business foundation" is a legal abomination,
requiring extermination by the courts, if attorneys-general are
unable to handle the problem. The courts have the inherent
power and duty to summarily stop perversion or willful disregard
of corporate and other propriety, whether or not the attorney-
general acts. 0
As early as 1907 courts recognized the true facts when a
partnership used a corporation as a mere instrumentality, and
80 People v. Volunteer Rescue Army, Inc., 262 A. D. 237, 28 N. Y. S. 2d
994, affd. without op. 39 N. Y. S. 2d 1022 (1943); and see, Com. ex rel.
Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 116 A. 2d 555 (1955);
Morrison v. Philadelphia College of Law, Inc., 56 Dauph. 265; Kardo Co.
v. Adams, 231 F. 950 (C. C. A. 6, 1916); 19 C. J. S. Corporations, Sec. 1651.
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the courts disregarded the seeming form and attached the con-
sequences of the "corporate" acts to the partnership.8 ' "Where
several corporations became in effect a single enterprise and
merged their operations (i.e., as in so many foundations), their
several entities were disregarded. .. 2 The cycle is completed by
reference to classic cases in which the fiction of corporate organ-
ization has been disregarded, but without recreating or recogniz-
ing any other entity . . . In fact, the courts have repeatedly
examined the underlying enterprise to find what its real purport
was . . . The nature of the enterprise determines the result,
negativing the corporate personality or any other form of
organization of that enterprise . . ." 83
In other words, the courts and their agencies (such as
attorneys-general) now can treat enterprises as what they are,
not as what they say they are. It is most disheartening, in this
day and age, that any attorney-general should revert to the
blindly formalistic doctrines of the past century-stubbornly
saying, in effect, that the label or form adopted by an enterprise
is the final determinant of what that enterprise really is. Today,
"in effect the courts look through the paper delineation to the
actual enterprise; and then determine whether it is criminal,
illegal, contrary to public policy, or otherwise bad (as the
circumstances may be) for individuals to conduct that enter-
prise by any kind of organization." 84
The Need For a New System of Regulation
In 1955, while writing Non-Profit Corporations and As-
sociations,8 5 I became convinced that the existing systems of
governmental regulation of "charities" and "merely non-profit"
organizations are quite inadequate. Others besides myself had
and have come to the same conclusion., With this in mind, I
drafted a Proposed Uniform Non-Profit Organizations Act, which
81 In re Rieger, 157 F. 609 (S. D. Ohio, 1907).
82 Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Co., 313 U. S. 215 (1941).
83 Berle, Enterprise-Entity Theory, 47 Columbia L. R. 343 (1947), citing
among many cases, United States v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 220 U. S. 257 (1911);
Chicago etc. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Assn., 247 U. S. 490 (1918); United
States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1919); Brundred v. Rice, 49 Ohio St.
640, 32 N. E. 169 (1892); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
84 Berle, supra, note 83.
85 Prentice-Hall, 1956; second printing 1959.
86 D'Amours, The Necessity for the Control of Public and Charitable Trusts,
in the 1946 Proceedings of the Natl. Assn. of Attys.-Gen. Conference (1947);
Nathan Report (on the English proposals) Charitable Trusts Committee Re-
port, CMD. No. 8710 (1952); Taylor, Public Accountability of Foundations
and Charitable Trusts (1953); Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State
Supervision of Charities, 52 Mich. L. R. 633 (1954); Lees, Governmental
Supervision of Charitable Trusts, in the 1955-6 U. of Mich. Law School
Legal Research Center report on Current Trends in State Legislation 609
(1957); Bolton & Weithorn, Conduct Endangering Exempt Status, in thi
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is set forth in the above-mentioned book.87 Without pretending
to be definitive, that proposed act included the governing device
of a separate licensing and regulating agency-which I termed
the "Licensing Commission for Non-Profit Organizations." It
would license and supervise both incorporated and unincor-
porated organizations, putting foundations in the same general
category as other charities or merely non-profit organizations as
the case might be. Or it would leave "business foundations" to
the governance of the business organization law.
The proposals elicited a thunderous silence from all quarters.
The American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Law
and the drafters of the proposed Model Non-Profit Corporations
Act exhibited something less than ecstatic enthusiasm for my
suggested Uniform Act. My remark that the Model Act smacked
of business corporation statute habitss8 undoubtedly had some-
thing to do with this cool reception; nor was my boldness cured
by the diffidence of my explanation that my proposed Act was
merely a suggestion.
A very recent (January, 1960) study of the inadequacies of
present regulation of foundations and other charities has been
made by Prof. Kenneth L. Karst of Ohio State University College
of Law.89 I shall not repeat here the facts and conclusions of
that excellent study, except to point out that Prof. Karst again
has emphasized the need for a regulatory agency similar to the
one I had suggested.9 0
Prof. Karst's fine work, however, is unhappily reminiscent
in one particular respect-he is concerned almost solely with the
administration of non-profit organizations after they have been
established.9 1 He pays small attention to the far more funda-
mental problem-the key to the whole matter-the nature of the
establishing process itself. Yet, if the organization process (foun-
dation or incorporation) is sound and healthy, the probability
of healthy operation becomes much greater. As Prof. Karst points
out, supervision by attorneys-general has been almost non-ex-
istent. But viewing all foundations as usually ipso facto valid
trusts is perpetuation of a fundamental misconception.
The need for a sound system of regulation now is very
serious. Meanwhile, however, the courts can prevent some of the
abuses-if they will. The typical system (in Ohio) of one as-
(Continued from preceding page)
Proceedings of 3rd Biennial N. Y. U. Conf. on Charitable Foundations, 193,
206 (1957); Report of N. H. Atty.-Gen., Supervision of Charitable Trusts,
1 (1958); Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 Harv. L. R. 433 (1960).
87 Supra, n. 85, at pp. 417-433.
88 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Assns., 418 (1956).
89 Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Re-
sponsibility, 73 Harv. L. R. 433-483 (1960).
90 Supra, n. 85, at pp. 417-433.
91 Supra, n. 89.
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sistant attorney-general to supervise 1130 registered trusts and
Heaven knows how many unregistered ones, not to mention
other types of organizations of this kind, is almost nonsensical.
If this sounds like a call for more government regulation-so be
it; it is exactly that.
Conclusion
The problem of abuse of the foundation device in fact con-
tains a socio-legal issue more important than the mere question
of whether a particular instrument is valid or invalid. It poses a
question that may well affect the future history of this nation.
In effect the issue is this:
Does this nation, or does it not, desire or permit an heredi-
tary aristocracy of wealth based on amoral manipulation of forms
and legal rituals, while the government turns a blind eye to it?
I submit that the whole course of law and history since
World War I, in this country, evidences a national policy that
wealth shall not be passed on perpetually by inheritance-that
sharp limits shall be put on the power of any person to control
wealth or power in perpetuity-that persons in each generation
shall earn (not inherit) wealth and power. Our almost con-
fiscatory inheritance and gift tax laws, for example, proclaim that
policy.
Evasion of that policy, whether by the use of stock options,
or "foundations," or whatever device, is a symptom that must be
met by repressive decisions and statutes. Our immediate prob-
lem here is the epidemic of misuse of the "charitable foundation"
as a device to perpetuate ownership and control by an "hereditary
aristocracy of wealth." That is a symptom of serious moral
disease. Not only repressive, but also curative measures are
needed.
The courts already have too long delayed the correction of
this "clever" abuse of policy. It is no exaggeration to say that
toleration of this kind of amoral conduct plays directly into the
hands of the enemies of our free (under law) system of capital-
ism. When the people see that wealth regularly can hire skillful
lawyers to evade and mock the law-policy declared by Congress
and Legislatures, ultimately the people will lose faith in their
laws and government.
More immediately, court toleration of hypocritical misuse of
charitable privilege already is having a bad effect on honest
founders and foundations. Admirably motivated foundations and
founders already find themselves viewed with suspicion. Hypo-
crites have clothed themselves in the fleece of charity, and it is
hard to tell the sheep from the goats.
The courts must declare that use of "charitable foundations"
for improper purposes no longer will be tolerated. That already
is the law. Application of that law can be effected only by courts
that study each particular set of case facts with penetrating un-
derstanding of their real, rather than seeming, nature.
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